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Abstract— Robust image hashing seeks to transform a given 
input image into a shorter hashed version using a key-
dependent non-invertible transform. These image hashes can 
be used for watermarking, image integrity authentication or 
image indexing for fast retrieval. This paper introduces a new 
method of generating image hashes based on extracting Higher 
Order Spectral features from the Radon projection of an input 
image. The feature extraction process is non-invertible, non-
linear and different hashes can be produced from the same 
image through the use of random permutations of the input. 
We show that the transform is robust to typical image 
transformations such as JPEG compression, noise, scaling, 
rotation, smoothing and cropping. We evaluate our system 
using a verification-style framework based on calculating false 
match, false non-match likelihoods using the publicly available 
Uncompressed Colour Image database (UCID) of 1320 images. 
We also compare our results to Swaminathan’s Fourier-Mellin 
based hashing method with at least 1% EER improvement 
under noise, scaling and sharpening. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The rapid growth of digital communication and 
proliferation of digital image capture has led to a surge in the 
volume of digital images stored and transmitted. The 
increased use of computer based image tools has also made it 
easy for the average individual to modify and edit these 
images. This creates a two-fold problem, firstly how to 
authenticate image data between two untrusting parties and 
secondly how to index images based on their visual content 
rather than user selected filenames or meta-data. 
In traditional internet applications such as text or data 
transmission cryptographic hash functions and digital 
signature schemes are used to validate content integrity. 
However, these methods are designed for deterministic 
inputs where every bit remains identical and are not suitable 
for image hashing. This is because human image perception 
is robust to pixel value changes, for example JPEG 
compression can alter a significant number of pixels in an 
image without altering its perceptual content. Similarly, 
image retrieval based on a bit-by-bit (or pixel-by-pixel) 
comparison would be both computationally expensive and 
inaccurate when presented with certain distortions such as 
scaling or cropping. 
As a result, a number of robust image hash algorithms 
have been proposed and a good hash function should display 
a number of invariance and security properties. We represent 
an image hash function as H{.}, the secret-key as S and the 
resulting hash (G) is obtained from an input image (I) via G 
= H{I,S}. 
1. Robust – The hash (G) produced from the image (I) 
should be invariant to common and minor image 
transformations such as noise, compression, 
geometric distortions, filtering and basic contrast 
changes. 
2. Secure – The hash generation process (H{.}) should 
be key-dependent so that without knowledge of the 
secret key (S) the correct hash (G) cannot be 
produced even if the image is known.  
3. Non-invertible – Given the secret key (S) and full 
knowledge of the hashing algorithm (H{.}) the 
original image (I) should not be reproducible from 
its hash value. Likewise, given the original image 
(I) and full knowledge of H{.} the secret key (S) 
should also be unrecoverable. 
4. Collision resistant – Although it is not possible for 
hash functions to be collision free (since hashing is 
a many-to-one function), it should be 
computationally hard to find these collisions. That 
is, it should be infeasible to find a set of images (I1, 
I2, I3…) where I1 ≠I2 ≠I3… but H{I3,S} = H{I2,S} 
= H{I3,S}. 
In this paper we describe a new robust image hash 
function that is non-linear, non-invertible and iterative. It is 
based on extracting Higher Order Spectral features from a 
1D input using a technique first proposed by Chandran et al. 
[2]. The method has previously been shown to be robust to 
Gaussian noise, translation, DC offset and amplification. In 
order to serve as a hash function the method has been 
modified to be iterative and non-invertible and has been used 
for biometric cryptography [3] and template security [4]. The 
Radon transform is used to convert a 2D image into a set of 
1D vectors suitable for the HOS feature extraction process as 
was done in [5]. We compare our technique against that of 
Swaminathan’s well known and high performing Fourier-
Mellin technique [1]. We benchmark using a verification-
style framework based on comparing equal error rates using 
the raw un-quantized features. We treat each image (and its 
modified versions) as a distinct class and use a Euclidean 
distance metric to compute intra and inter-class separation. 
This was chosen over the usual normalized hamming 
distance approach for two reasons, firstly the most 
challenging part of robust hash function is feature extraction 
[6] which is mostly independent of the quantization process. 
Secondly, similar to biometric verification, hash functions 
need to be both robust and discriminative and equal error 
rates allow both to be compared simultaneously whereas a 
normalized hamming distance measures robustness alone. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
briefly summarizes existing methods with an extended 
description of Swaminathan’s polar Fourier technique. 
Section 3 outlines the steps of our HOS based image hash 
method. Section 4 illustrates the performance using the 
publicly available UCID database 
II. BACKGROUND 
One of the earliest methods to display these properties 
was proposed by Fridrich et al. [7]  who produced an image 
hash by projecting the image using a set of zero-mean 
random patterns generated based on the secret-key (usually a 
password used as the seed for a pseudorandom number 
generator). This technique was shown to be robust to noise 
and filtering-based image modifications but was not 
invariant to scale and rotation. It was also shown in [8] to be 
collision prone, an arbitrary image could be modified so that 
it produces the same hash as a known image by statistically 
modeling the hash bit generation process using Adaboost.   
Venkatesen et al. [9] proposed a scheme where the 
wavelet transform was applied to a random block of the 
input image to extract robust features. The secret key is used 
to generate 4 random numbers (x,y,w,h) that are used to 
describe the location and size of the random block (where 
(x,y) are the coordinates of the top left corner of the block 
and (w,h) are the width and height of the block respectively). 
The method was shown in [10] to be susceptible to a form of 
the hill-climb attack [11] where an iterative algorithm could 
be applied to search for a set of random numbers (x,y,w,h) 
that produced the closest matching hash. Knowledge of 
(x,y,w,h) is the equivalent of knowing the secret-key (S). 
Some other methods also rely on the Radon transform, in 
particular the Radon Soft Hash (RASH) [12, 13] but these 
methods use the Radon projection features directly without 
adding some form of key-dependency or non-invertability to 
the process. Ou and Rhee [14] also presented a Radon 
transform based hash function where the 1D-DCT was used 
to extract features from 40 randomly selected rotation angles. 
Their evaluation was limited to using a single image (Lena) 
compared against 500 impostor images.  Controlled 
randomness is introduced by using secret-key dependent 
permutation of the DCT features. However, since the 
permutation is applied after feature extraction it changes only 
the ordering but not the actual feature values. 
The use of HOS features, the fourth-order cumulants, 
was proposed by Weng and Preneel [15]. However their 
performance evaluation was limited to only 4 images and 
applicability of the method as an image hash function cannot 
be verified without more comprehensive testing. 
Swaminathan et al. [1] proposed a Fourier-Mellin based 
image hash function that offered more robustness over a 
number of previous methods. Swaminathan takes the 2D 
Fourier Transform of the input image and obtains hash 
features by circularly summing the magnitude of Fourier 
coefficients that are a certain radius (ρ) away from the origin 
(or zero-frequency component) as shown in Figure 1. The 
radii, ρ (rho), are dependent on image size and are 
normalized to be between 0 and 1. Sixty-four different values 
of ρ, equally spaced between 0 and 0.4 were used by the 
authors [10] to produce a hash feature vector of length 64 
denoted as K. 
Security and non-invertability is then achieved by 
linearly transforming the hash feature vector by applying a 
random projection using a matrix M. The values in M are 
normally distributed random numbers of zero-mean and unit 
variance obtained using the secret-key (S). Random 
projection is a well known technique in privacy preserving 
data-mining and biometric template security. It relies on 
matrix multiplication as means of data compression and if 
the elements of M are chosen using a statistical criterion then 
the Euclidean distance relationship between inputs can be 
maintained in the resulting projected space.  However since 
the process is linear there exists a number of methods able to 
invert the random projection [16]. The authors in [10] show 
that if enough input/hash pairs produced using the same 
secret-key (S) are known, then an attacker can recover the 
secret-key (S).  This is similar to Shannon’s concept of 
Unicity distance in encryption systems where the uncertainty 
of the encryption key is decreased for every 
plaintext/ciphertext pair known. 
This concept can be practically applied to Random 
projections because matrix multiplication can be represented 
as a set of linear equations. It can be easily shown that an 
unknown matrix M of size NxN can be completely obtained 
from N independent sets of G and K where each G = MxK, 
this matrix multiplication can be written as N sets of N linear 
equations thus M can be solved with N sets of G and K. 
III. THE HOS IMAGE HASH 
HOS based features extracted from a 1D signal input 
have a number of useful invariant features [2]. We briefly 
summarise these below before describing how a 2D image 
input can be meaningfully converted to a set of 1D vectors 
that can take advantage of these invariance properties. 
Figure 1: Swaminathan’s technique obtains features by summing along 
circles of different radii, ρ (rho) in the frequency domain. Three such 
circles are shown above with ρ of 0.02, 0.2 and 0.4. Note that in the 
above image the frequency domain is log-transformed then normalized 
for display. 
1. HOS features have zero expected value for 
Gaussian noise. 
2. Are invariant to both DC-offset and amplitude 
scaling, which can be trivially achieved through 
normalisation of the input signal. 
3. Are invariant to scaling of the 1D input signal by 
either decimation or interpolation (shrinking or 
stretching of the 1D signal along the time-domain). 
4. HOS features rely on Fourier phase information, 
which is a shape-dependent non-linear function of 
the frequency of the input. 
 
The Radon transform is a well suited method of 
converting an image into a set of 1D vectors (Figure 2). It 
can be thought of as the summation of pixel values along 
each column as the image is rotated about its centre. It can 
then be easily seen that. 
 
1. An image affected by Gaussian noise will produce 
1D projections also affected by Gaussian noise 
since the summation of Gaussian distributed 
random variables is also Gaussian. 
2. An image affected by uniformly distributed salt & 
pepper noise produces 1D projections that are DC 
offset by an amount related to the percentage of 
noisy pixels and to the ratio of salt to pepper noise. 
3. Rotation of the image results in a circular shift of 
the set of 1D projections.  
4. Scaling of the image that preserves aspect ratio (a 
scaling in both directions) results in a similar 
scaling of each of the 1D projections. 
5. A change in overall image brightness results in a 
multiplicative amplification of each 1D projection. 
6. Smoothing of the image results in a smoothing of 
the 1D projections, if the smoothing is relatively 
minor than the overall shape of the 1D projections 
will remain unchanged.  
7. Compression of the image results in changes to 
pixel values of the image (dependent on 
compression amount). The 1D projections can 
remain largely unchanged since they are the 
summation of pixel values. 
8. Cropping of the image by an equal amount along 
both axes results in a similar cropping of the 1D 
projections. 
 
The Radon transform when practically applied to an 
image of size MxN produces 1D projections of length (L) 
2 2M N which corresponds to the diagonal length of the 
image. The projections produced from rotation angles other 
than those that orientate the image along its diagonal (θ = 
45°,135°,225°, 315°) will be shorter in length but are zero 
padded so that all projections are of equal length. Also the 
Radon transform at angles other than 0°, 90°, 180° and 270° 
results in an image that is not rectangular but diamond in 
shape with a thick centre that tapers to a point at each end 
(see Figure 3). This results in 1D projections that have an 
underlying shape dependent not only the image content but 
also on θ, this is detrimental to the HOS feature extraction 
which is sensitive to shape (property 4). To overcome this, 
Radon projections are normalized by the number of pixels in 
each column. This can be done easily by dividing the 
original projections by the projections obtained from an 
identically sized image composed entirely of ones.  
Each projection is then permuted using the secret-key (S), 
this allows for L-factorial possible different permutations. A 
moderately sized image of 256x256 has an L of 362 resulting 
in 362! combinations that an attacker would need to brute-
force search. Permuting in such a way can significantly alter 
the shape and frequency profile of a given input. The 
resulting HOS features are highly sensitive to such 
transformations. 
Features can then be extracted from these 1D projections 
producing a separate feature vector for each value of θ. Each 
of these 1D projections is first zero padded to four times its 
original length to improve spectral resolution. This is then 
scaled by the magnitude of the largest element and then 
made zero-mean by subtracting the mean. The N-point 
discrete Fourier transform (DFT) of this normalized vector 
( )x n is then taken to obtain ( )X f from which the magnitude 
spectrum ( ( )X f ) can be computed. The magnitude 
spectrum   is then zero padded to length N to produce: 
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estimated from this by Fourier transforming y(n). The phase 
spectrum is retained thus making the bispectrum complex 
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to asymmetry. The bispectrum is then integrated along radial 
slices in the bifrequency plane to obtain: 
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Figure 2: The resulting 1D projection obtained from radon 
transformation of ( , )f x y  at angle . 
 
 
Frequencies are normalized by the Nyquist frequency and 
the zero frequency component (or average signal) is 
eliminated from the above computation and a is the slope of 
the line in bifrequency (f1,f2) space along which the integral 
is computed.  
The original process is modified to become iterative by 
feeding back the integrated bispectrum as a complex valued 
input vector of length N for the next iteration. The 
normalization step guarantees the transformation will be 
stable regardless of the number of iterations taken and also 
does not tend towards zero output owing to loss of precision 
alone. From each iteration a measure of change is extracted. 
This measure is the complex valued inner product (dot 
product) of the difference between the previous and present 
outputs with the previous output, 
 
1 1
1
1 1
0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
exp( )
i i i i
N
i i i
n
i i
D n x n x n x n
x n x n x n
M j
 

 

        
        

                 (3) 
 
where i represents the i-th iteration and D is the dot product 
that can be represented as a magnitude (M) and angle (Φ) 
pair (one pair per iteration). This can be viewed as a method 
of controlled information loss since it is only the resultant 
product (magnitude/angle pair) that are stored rather than the 
integrated bispectrum itself. The nature of the dot product 
also means that slight changes in the input will result in only 
slight change in output. These magnitude/angle pairs are 
used as the transformed features. An i-length feature vector 
will be produced for each angle (θ) used in the Radon 
transform. Feature-fusion or score-fusion can be applied to 
produce a single decision from this set of feature vectors. In 
this paper we apply the Radon transform at 4 angles (0°, 45°, 
90°, 135°) obtaining 4 separate feature vectors. We match 
each vector separately and employ score-fusion by using the 
minimum score obtained. 
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
In order to benchmark the performance of the HOS based 
image hash function we use the publicly available UCID 
database [17] which contain 1320 colour images of size 
512x384 (or 384x512) of a wide range of content (see Figure 
 
4 for some examples). Each image undergoes two minor pre-
processing steps:  
1. The image is converted to grey-scale and pixels are 
normalised to have a value between 0 and 1. 
2. If the image is 384x512 it is rotated by 90 degrees 
to be 512x384. 
These pre-processed images form the training-set that is 
hashed using both Swaminathan’s Fourier-Mellin technique 
(as described in section 2) and our HOS image hash. Each 
image then undergoes a total of 22 different transformations 
(summarised in Table 1) and these form the test-set of 29040 
images. Biometric style verification can be performed by 
attempting to verify each image in the test-set with one in the 
training-set using Euclidean distance as a measure of 
difference between feature vectors. The resulting false 
match, false non-match likelihoods are used to produce equal 
error rate (EER) measurements that can be used to compare 
both robustness and discriminative ability of the resulting 
image hashes. 
Table 1 summarizes the EER performance of the two 
methods under image transformations over the entire UCID 
database. The HOS hash achieves a superior overall EER 
when larger transformations (variable 2) are applied and has 
much better performance when image are affected by noise 
(both Gaussian and salt & pepper), scaling and sharpening. 
The large improvements for noise and scaling can be 
attributed to the invariance properties of the HOS features 
that the hash function relies on.  Swaminathan’s method is 
slightly better when images are filtered (both mean and 
median), JPEG compressed or have deleted boxes, although 
this difference is small. Swaminathan’s method does 
outperform the HOS hash when images are cropped or 
rotated. Once robust features are extracted any method of 
optimal quantization can be applied such as DROBA [18]. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has presented a new method of producing 
robust and secure image hashes. The technique takes 
advantage of invariance properties of Higher Order Spectral 
features extracted from Radon projections of the input 
image. The method is non-linear, iterative through feedback 
Figure 4: The UCID database contains a wide range of real-world images 
taken both indoor and outdoor of people, objects and scenery. 
Figure 3: The shape of 1D projections are dependent on θ due to zero-
padding applied when θ ≠ 0°, 90°, 180° or 270°. A normalization step is 
required to remove this θ dependent shape.  
and includes a step of robust information loss in the form of 
a dot product at each iteration. Controlled randomness is 
introduced by permuting the image-derived Radon 
projections using a user/transmission dependent secret-key 
(S). The method is shown to be robust over the relatively 
large UCID database of real world images and out performs 
Swaminathans’ Fourier-Mellin image hash under certain 
transformations (particularly noise and scaling). The non-
linear nature of transformation coupled with the novel 
method of controlled randomness makes the method difficult 
to analyse and provides increased complexity to brute force 
attack. 
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Transformation Swaminathan’s 
 Fourier-Mellin Hash 
HOS Hash 
 Variable 1 Variable 2 Variable 1 Variable 2 Variable 1 Variable 2 
JPEG Compression  80% Quality 10% Quality 0% 0.0056% 0% 0.1340% 
Gaussian Noise 0.01 Variance 0.1 variance 1.23% 16.63% 0.1532% 1.64% 
Salt & Pepper Noise 5% pixels 40% pixels 1.65% 35.61% 0.2217% 3.42% 
Scaling 1.02x 1.1x 1.06%% 49% 0.0012% 0.0015% 
Mean filtering 3x3 Window 15x15 
Window 
0.001% 0.4228% 0.003% 0.8284% 
Median filtering 3x3 Window 15x15 
Window 
0.2207% 2.057% 0.4454% 2.84% 
Deletion of Columns 3 columns 15 columns 0.0722% 1.26% 0.1516% 0.7378% 
Deletion of Box 3x3 Box 15x15 box 0% 0.0002% 0% 0.2813% 
Cropping of pixels 
from each border 
1 pixel  15 pixels  0.0002% 4.51% 0.1477% 9.72% 
Sharpening 3x3 laplacian 2.41% 0.4545% 
Rotation 2 degrees 10 degrees 2.04% 19.75% 6.63% 28.18% 
All transformations --- 1.24% 17.13% 1.65% 6.74% 
Table 1: Equal error rate (EER) comparison of the two image hash algorithms given images affected by different transformations. 
Rotated images are also cropped to remove zero padding after rotation then resized to their original size as was done in [1] . 
